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Note
Blight and Its Discontents: Awarding Attorney’s
Fees to Property Owners in Redevelopment
Actions
Noreen E. Johnson∗
In June 2007, National City, California renewed a designation declaring two-thirds of the city blighted.1 The city council’s
decision to renew this comprehensive designation came as a
blow to Carlos Barragan and his son, Carlos Jr., who had spent
over fifteen years building a strong after-school program for atrisk youth in their community2 and finally moved the program
to a newly renovated gym in 2002.3 With this declaration of
blight, the Barragans faced the imminent threat that their
newly renovated gym would be replaced by upscale condominiums.4 Despite numerous requests to the city to provide their
findings of blight under the California Public Records Act,5 the
city refused to release the results of the 2007 blight study until
a few days before the hearing, making any meaningful opposi-

∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2006,
St. Olaf College. The author would like to thank the many members of the
Minnesota Law Review who offered comments and suggestions for this Note,
particularly Elizabeth Borer, Jenni Vainik, Lindsey Yock, and Charlie Dickinson. She would also like to thank her faculty advisor, Professor Alexandra
Klass, for valuable help in honing the analysis of this Note. Finally, she would
like to thank her wonderful parents, Bill and Jane Johnson, and her sister,
Laura, for their constant love and support. Copyright © 2008 by Noreen E.
Johnson.
1. See Inst. for Justice, Knocking Out Eminent Domain Abuse: Youth
Gym Files Suit Against National City, Calif., http://www.ij.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=868 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
2. Id. For the Community Youth Athletic Center (CYAC) website describing their program and the services they provide, see CYAC Programs and
Events, http://cyacboxing.org/events/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
3. CYAC Boxing Timeline, http://cyacboxing.org/media/flash/ (follow the
“2002” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
4. See Inst. for Justice, supra note 1.
5. CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 6250–6276.48 (West 2008).
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tion to the findings nearly impossible.6 To make matters worse,
after the hearings, the Barragans had only ninety days to file
suit before they lost their right to object.7
The Barragans were fortunate. A public interest law firm
took their case, representing them at the public hearings related to the official determination of blight8 and filing a civil
suit challenging the city’s actions as contrary to state and federal law.9 As a result of their legal representation and the media backlash that came from increased public awareness,10 the
developers indicated that they may be willing to build around
the gym.11 More importantly, the Barragans have a chance to
voice their objections to the blight designation in court.12
Many property owners and business owners, however, are
not so lucky. Given the cost and expense of mounting a legal
challenge to a redevelopment project or condemnation action, it
is very difficult for the average American to even consider challenging a redevelopment agency’s decision.13 The procedures in
National City and other cities across the United States make
the process for opposing them so complicated and onerous that
it is almost impossible for ordinary citizens to respond and object to these designations. The difficulties property owners face
apply with equal force to condemnation actions, in which the
property owner is made an involuntary defendant and is unlikely to capably navigate the difficult legal and factual issues
6. See Inst. for Justice, supra note 1.
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501 (Supp. 2008) (effective Jan. 1,
2007).
8. See Inst. for Justice, supra note 1.
9. For the official complaint filed on September 25, 2007, with the California Superior Court, see Complaint, Com. Youth Athletic Ctr v. Nat’l City,
No. GIS 37-2007-00076404-CU-EI-SC (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/private_property/national_
city/NationalCityComplaint.pdf.
10. For an example of the media backlash against National City’s actions,
see Rick Reilly, An Unfair Fight, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 13, 2007, at 88.
11. Tanya Sierra, Developer Won’t Oust Popular Gym; He’ll Build Project
Around It, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego
.com/uniontrib/20070830/news_1m30ncgym.html.
12. The case is currently on appeal after being dismissed by the district
judge on a technicality in February 2008. See Inst. for Justice, Eminent Domain Case Dismissed on Technicality, Gym Will Appeal (Feb. 15, 2008), http://
www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=869&Itemid=165.
13. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation
Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 887–90 (2007) (suggesting that many individuals, particularly owners of low-value lots, lack the resources to mount a viable
challenge to a redevelopment project).
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of “public use”14 and “just compensation”15 without hiring a
lawyer.
Part I of this Note reviews the development of the publicuse doctrine of eminent domain, including its crystallization in
the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London.16 It explores the development of the justifications for urban renewal from the elimination of blight to pure economic
development, and it discusses the states’ backlash against Kelo
which has resulted in a plethora of new laws and additional
substantive and procedural protections for property owners.
Finally, this Part discusses the difficulties that a property owner may face in challenging a finding of public use or a condemnation award.
Part II suggests that, while state reform efforts have provided significant additional protections to property owners,
they are frequently poorly implemented, thus undermining the
efforts of the state legislatures. It analyzes several proposals
that have been made to improve implementation of these laws
and argues that a simple fee-shifting statute, providing that litigation expenses be paid by the condemning authority in certain cases, would be the most efficient means for states to reinforce these reforms. While some states have utilized fee shifting
in eminent domain proceedings since the 1970s,17 very few
scholars have examined the intersections of these two bodies of
law, despite the increased attention to eminent domain reform
in the wake of Kelo. This is an important gap in the scholarly
literature because fee shifting represents a practical and effective solution to some of the problems posed by redevelopment
and could be easily employed alongside other eminent domain
reforms. This Note concludes with a useful model state statute,
which would allow property owners to claim their rights under
state law by improving their access to legal representation.
This issue of eminent domain reform was never more relevant than it is today. Over the three years since Kelo, almost
every state has either reformed or considered reforming its
eminent domain code18 and state courts have begun to scrutin14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See id.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001) (enacted 1971).
See CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT
DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO 1–4 (2007) (providing a comprehensive fifty-state survey of changes to state eminent domain laws since Kelo).
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ize these cases more carefully than in years past.19 The increased attention state legislatures and courts are paying to
this issue is likely due to the fact that people across a broad
spectrum of political values and beliefs are concerned about the
inappropriate use of eminent domain.20 Surveys suggest that
eighty-one percent of the American population opposes the Kelo
decision,21 and the overwhelming opposition to the decision
crosses both race and political party lines.22 Thus, state legislatures are now actively considering ways to reform their eminent domain code to protect the rights of property owners, both
substantively and procedurally. Yet despite the increased attention to the issue of eminent domain, only a small group of
states have enacted or amended fee-shifting statutes as part of
their reform efforts.23 Thus, while a substantial minority of
states have fee-shifting statutes on the books,24 many of these
statutes have not been updated since Kelo.25 A careful look at
these statutes, both recent and older, suggests that a number of
them could be significantly improved to better address the concerns raised by Kelo.26 Moreover, over half of states do not provide for fee shifting in the eminent domain context at all.27
19. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 651, 673 (2008) (“The public, legislative, and judicial reaction to
Kelo was significant and swift. Throughout the country, the public, state legislatures, and state courts were quick to take up Justice Stevens’ invitation to
narrow what constitutes a public use as a matter of state law.”).
20. A brief survey of the amicus briefs submitted in support of Suzette Kelo reveals the wide appeal of this issue. See, e.g., Brief for the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469
(No. 04-108); Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108); Brief for the National Ass’n for the
Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
21. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2009).
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (2007); IOWA CODE § 6B.33
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MINN.
STAT. § 117.031 (2006).
24. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890 (estimating that
twenty states have provisions that provide for fee shifting in some cases in the
eminent domain context).
25. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2005) (last amended 1999); N.Y. EM.
DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 701–702 (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06).
26. For example, the Pennsylvania statute provides for fee shifting only
up to $4,000. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008).
27. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890.
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Thus, the time has never been riper to consider additional protections for property owners that would add significant teeth to
preexisting and pending eminent domain reforms.
I. BLIGHT, PUBLIC USE, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF
REDEVELOPMENT LAW
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”28 This small clause of the
Constitution caused a firestorm of controversy ever since the
Supreme Court handed down its now notorious decision in Kelo
v. City of New London.29 In Kelo, a group of homeowners
brought suit against the city of New London, Connecticut to
oppose the city’s decision to initiate condemnation proceedings
to transfer their homes to Pfizer Corporation as part of a redevelopment plan for the renewal of the city center.30 The petitioners, none of whose properties was found blighted or in poor
condition,31 argued that the taking of their properties violated
the public use limitation implicit in the Fifth Amendment and
asked for injunctive relief.32 The Kelo Court rejected the petitioners’ claims and held that the Public Use Clause permitted
local governments to transfer property from one private party
to another for the public purpose of economic development.33
Kelo did not revolutionize redevelopment law, but rather affirmed a long line of precedent applying a deferential standard
of review to economic development projects.34 However, it disappointed some scholars who had hoped that the Supreme
Court would limit the almost limitless scope of some of its earlier decisions.35 Before Kelo, a minority of scholars maintained
that public use meant “public right of access.”36 However, the
Supreme Court in Kelo read public use as “public purpose,” al28. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
29. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
30. Id. at 473–77.
31. Id. at 475.
32. Id. at 474–77.
33. Id. at 483–86.
34. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
35. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 243–44 (2007) (criticizing the majority’s decision and reasoning in Kelo).
36. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161–69 (1985).
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lowing any private-to-private transfers of property using eminent domain for economic-development purposes.37
This ruling was immediately attacked by public figures on
both the left38 and right39 and has become a political flashpoint
in the last two years. Although few scholars of property law
were surprised by the Kelo decision,40 ordinary Americans responded viscerally to the potentially broad sweep of the decision.41 Justice O’Connor captured the fears of many in her dissent: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with
a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm
with a factory.”42 Trying to limit some of the potential implications of the decision, forty-two states reformed their eminent
domain laws by 2007, many to create narrower public use interpretations.43 However, despite these stricter provisions,
many statutes contain significant loopholes that weaken the efficacy of the reform efforts.44
A. FROM THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY TO KELO: FROM
BLIGHT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The theory of modern urban redevelopment grew out of the
Chicago school of sociology during the 1920s and 1930s.45 Soci37. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
38. For Ralph Nader’s reaction to Kelo, see Ralph Nader, Statement, June
23, 2005, http://ml.greens.org/pipermail/ctgp-news/2005-June/000507.html
(“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London mocks
common sense, tarnishes constitutional law and is an affront to fundamental
fairness.”).
39. For Rush Limbaugh’s reaction to Kelo, see Rush Limbaugh, Rush
Limbaugh: Liberals Like Stephen Breyer Have Bastardized the Constitution
(Radio Transcript Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/
1501453/posts (“Kelo was decided in favor of the big guy, and Kelo was decided, by the way, in a way that the Constitution doesn’t say.”).
40. See The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14
(2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Thomas Merrill, Professor, Columbia Law School) (discussing his own lack of surprise at the Kelo decision).
41. See Somin, supra note 21, at 5–7.
42. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
43. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 1 (providing a comprehensive fifty-state survey of changes to state eminent domain laws since Kelo).
44. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” so Far: Will Americans Get
Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709, 727; Somin, supra note 21, at 11.
45. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 16
(2003).
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ologists, such as Ernest Burgess and Roderick D. McKenzie,
studied the lives of the poor in urban centers and developed an
“ecological approach” to the development of cities.46 Following
this approach, urban planners and real estate developers
worked together to reconstruct American cities by advocating
for greater urban planning and the elimination of slums and
blight.47 Slums were generally understood to be dangers to public health and safety, while blighted areas were in the process
of evolving into slums.48 Blight was a word that originally referred to plant disease but was incorporated into the rhetoric of
urban planners to suggest the organic nature of city development and decline.49 The only way to prevent this steady decline
was centralized city planning.50
From the beginning, the theory was plagued by the problem of creating a precise definition of blight.51 For example, the
Committee of Blighted Areas and Slums, a creation of Herbert
Hoover’s tenure as Secretary of Commerce, stated that “a
blighted area is an area where, due either to the lack of a vitalizing factor or to the presence of a devitalizing factor, the life of
the area has been sapped.”52 Since this theory was based on
terms that were never well-defined, its effects were difficult to
contain and it could be used as a justification for projects
tainted by other motivations.53 For instance, from the beginning the federal urban-renewal program had racial overtones54
and often had the effect of forcing new immigrants and minorities out of their neighborhoods.55
46. Id. For an example of this “organic” approach to urban sociology, see
R. D. McKenzie, The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community, in THE CITY 63 (1925).
47. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 15–16.
48. Id. at 18. This distinction between “slum” and “blight” is rarely observed in the literature surrounding urban planning today.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 17.
51. The problem of defining “blight” precisely continues today. See Somin,
supra note 35, at 265–68.
52. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 15–18.
53. For a classic critique of the federal urban renewal movement, see
MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL 1949–1962, at 219–23 (1964).
54. For example, Homer Hoyt argued that “certain racial and national
groups . . . cause a greater physical deterioration of property than groups
higher in the social and economic scale.” Pritchett, supra note 45, at 17; see
also ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 7–8.
55. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 17–20. For example, blight laws frequently
targeted those who owned small apartment buildings or tenements. The own-
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This new program of urban redevelopment was not without
its critics and many argued that forced redevelopment was unconstitutional.56 However, with the change in Supreme Court
jurisprudence during the New Deal, the federal courts became
more deferential to state and agency judgments in economic
matters and were increasingly willing to acquiesce to whatever
projects the state agencies deemed necessary.57
This approach to urban planning was crystallized in the
Supreme Court’s 1954 decision, Berman v. Parker.58 In Berman, the Supreme Court upheld the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency’s ambitious redevelopment project for
Southwest D.C on the grounds that the use of eminent domain
to remove blight was a public use within the context of the
Fifth Amendment.59 In this case, the challenger owned a department store in a poor African American neighborhood in
Washington, D.C.60 At the district court level, the court upheld
the constitutionality of the Redevelopment Act but interpreted
it narrowly, finding that it applied only to slum clearance and
ers of these buildings were frequently immigrant Jews and Italians who had
very little money or education and were unwilling to sell their only properties
for the prices developers were offering. Id. at 20. For a fascinating visual depiction of the Chicago sociologists’ view of urban areas, see Ernest W. Burgess,
The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project, in THE CITY 55
(1925).
56. For example, the Sixth Circuit declared it unconstitutional for the
Public Works Administration to condemn land for a housing program. United
States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 687–88 (6th Cir.
1935) (“The taking of one citizen’s property for the purpose of improving it and
selling or leasing it to another, or for the purpose of reducing unemployment,
is not, in our opinion, within the scope of the powers of the federal government.”). Although this decision deals with the limits on federal projects rather
than state projects, it still illustrates the skepticism with which some courts
viewed the federal government’s redevelopment projects during the early New
Deal era.
57. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 40–41.
58. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
59. Id. at 30, 33–34.
60. A survey of the area showed that “64.3% of the dwellings were beyond
repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory . . . .” Id. at
30. It also showed that 97.5% were inhabited by African Americans. Id. In a
pointed critique of the racial implications of this redevelopment plan, Professor Wendell Pritchett pointed out that
Berman was argued just four months after the Supreme Court’s monumental declaration on American race relations in Brown v. Board
of Education . . . . But the two cases were intimately related. The urban renewal program that the Court approved allowed cities to redistribute their populations, increasing residential segregation and thereby making the integration of schools far more difficult.
Pritchett, supra note 45, at 44.
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could not be used to clear blighted or deteriorating properties,
as the Government argued.61 The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s finding of constitutionality but on much broader
grounds. Justice Douglas wrote:
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.62

Although it was clear that there were genuine slums in the
area set for redevelopment,63 by showing so much deference to
the agency’s decisions and embracing so broad a definition of
the statute,64 the Supreme Court set the stage for more expansive uses of blight in the future. In addition, by adopting such a
deferential standard of review, the Court left few judicial protections in place for homeowners and business owners to challenge overbroad blight designations.65
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo was in many
ways a natural outgrowth of the urban-renewal movement of
the 1920s and 1930s and of the decision in Berman. Yet, while
61. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724–25 (D.D.C.
1953) (“We hold that Congress did not in the Redevelopment Act confer power
to seize property beyond the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and prevention, the word ‘slum’ meaning conditions injurious to the public health,
safety, morals and welfare.”).
62. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (internal citation omitted). The district court
took quite a different approach. Cf. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 719 (“The slow,
the old, the small in ambition, the devotee of the outmoded have no less right
to property than have the quick, the young, the aggressive, and the modernistic or futuristic.”).
63. For instance, the neighborhood had more than twice the average
number of deaths from tuberculosis in the District and more than four times
the average number of deaths from syphilis. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 709.
64. The statute itself was hardly a model of clarity. There was no definition of “slums” or “blighted areas.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.*. The closest the
Act came to defining these terms was in Section 3(r), which states:
“Substandard housing conditions” means the conditions obtaining in
connection with the existence of any dwelling, or dwellings, or housing accommodations for human beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of these
factors, is in the opinion of the Commissioners detrimental to the
safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
65. While Berman did not explicitly set forth a particular standard of review, the Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff interpreted the decision as simply requiring judicial deference to state legislatures’ determinations when reviewing redevelopment projects. 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984).
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Berman dealt with an impoverished neighborhood that had
been designated blighted by a legislative determination,66 Kelo
dealt with properties that even the redevelopers did not argue
were blighted.67 By holding that the Public Use Clause permits
the transfer of property from one private party to another for
the purpose of economic development alone,68 the Court embraced the broad dicta of Justice Douglas’s opinion in Berman.
Furthermore, the Court clearly removed a finding of blight as a
precondition to the use of eminent domain in economic redevelopment.69
B. THE STATE REACTION TO KELO: BACK TO BLIGHT
In the wake of Kelo, many commentators despaired that
economic development was so broad a justification for redevelopment that there could be no meaningful judicial review of
condemnation actions on the grounds of public use.70 With the
public use effectively read out of the Constitution, citizens had
no means to challenge takings of their property except to demand just compensation.71 However, while much of the broad
language in Kelo suggests such an outcome, this result was
checked by unprecedented grounds, well in opposition that led
forty-two states to pass stricter laws, limiting the use of eminent domain in at least some circumstances.72
In many ways, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Kelo actually set the groundwork for this wave of state responses to
the ruling. Stevens stressed the possibility of stricter state
standards for redevelopment. He explained that “nothing in
[the] opinion precludes any State from placing further restric66. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
67. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (“Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight . . . .”).
68. Id. at 483–84.
69. Justice O’Connor’s dissent distinguishes Berman from Kelo by emphasizing the blight and poverty afflicting the neighborhood in Berman. See id. at
498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 503–04 (raising slippery slope arguments against an expansive
definition of public use).
71. Even before Kelo, many scholars of American property law had suggested that the Public Use Clause had been all but read out of the Constitution. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
190 n.5 (1977) (“[T]he modern understanding of ‘public use’ holds that any
state purpose otherwise constitutional should qualify as sufficiently ‘public’ to
justify a taking . . . .”). Viewed this way, Kelo is merely the crystallization of a
much longer line of cases.
72. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 1.
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tions on its exercise of the takings power” and emphasized that
“many States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are
stricter than the federal baseline,” either through the requirements of their state constitutions or their more restrictive eminent domain statutes.73 Thus, even as Justice Stevens’ opinion
reaffirmed the Berman view of public use and urban renewal as
a matter of constitutional law, it also highlighted the possibility
of change on the state level.
1. The Kelo Backlash in the State Legislatures
The response of state legislatures to Justice Stevens’ suggestion has been overwhelming, yet varied from state to state.
For example, South Dakota passed legislation in 2006 to prohibit all private-to-private transfers of private property, regardless of blight;74 that same year, Minnesota tightened the definition of blight75 and largely limited private redevelopment to
those properties deemed actually blighted.76 Other states, such
as Mississippi and Massachusetts, have not passed any redevelopment reforms at all.77
While many states made meaningful and important reforms in the area of eminent domain law, there remain many
significant loopholes that limit the efficacy of such laws.78 One
of the most substantial is the states’ treatment of blight.79 Although a few states banned all takings for purely economic development,80 many left their blight laws unchanged and continued to allow economic development takings in cases of

73. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (majority opinion).
74. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 (Supp. 2008).
75. MINN. STAT. § 117.025 (2006) (defining a “blighted area” as an area in
“urban use . . . where more than fifty percent of the buildings are structurally
substandard”).
76. Id. § 117.027.
77. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 25, 28.
78. See Somin, supra note 35, at 261.
79. See id. at 266 (“In the years since those early cases, many states have
expanded the concept of blight to encompass almost any area where economic
development could potentially be increased.”); Will Lovell, Note, The Kelo
Blowback: How the Newly-Enacted Eminent Domain Statutes and Past Blight
Statutes Are a Maginot Line-Defense Mechanism for All Non-Affluent and Minority Property Owners, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 611–12 (2007) (discussing loopholes with regards to blight designations in the wake of state legislative
reform).
80. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 12-a; ALA. CODE § 11-80-1 (Supp.
2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801 (2007).
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blight.81 This failure to define blight precisely means that these
laws are frequently so broad and vague that definitions may be
applied to middle class neighborhoods as well as true slums.82
In states that eliminated economic development as a public use
while retaining broad eminent domain powers for blight removal, this may undermine the reforms that state legislatures
passed by allowing redevelopment that serves ends more akin
to economic development than slum removal.83 Furthermore,
municipal governments tend to prefer middle-class communities over impoverished areas as locations for redevelopment
projects since it is easier to attract businesses to build there.84
Thus, the effect of an overbroad definition of blight is that these
statutes may be manipulated to redevelop middle-class neighborhoods rather than urban slums.85 Some states identified this
problem and passed more precise blight laws,86 but many still
have definitions that are notably vague.87
81. CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 6, 17, 21, 23, 30, 46, 47, 49.
82. For example, in West 41st Street Realty LLC v. New York State Urban
Development Corp., a New York appellate court found the Times Square area
of downtown Manhattan was blighted and upheld an urban redevelopment
project to provide the New York Times with a new headquarters. 744 N.Y.S.2d
121, 123–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see also Somin, supra note 35, at 264–71
(providing a good background discussion of the problems with overbroad blight
designations).
83. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305,
307 (2004) (“Clearly ‘blight’ has lost any substantive meaning as either a description of urban conditions or a target for public policy. . . . Redevelopment
policies originally intended to address unsafe or insufficient urban housing are
now more routinely employed to subsidize the building of suburban shopping
malls.”).
84. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 994 (2001).
85. Cf. id. (“City renewal directors quickly learned there was no realistic
chance that private builders could be drawn to developing commercial projects
in hopelessly blighted areas.”).
86. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. § 117.025
(2006); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205 (West Supp. 2008).
87. For instance, Colorado defines “blighted area” as follows:
“Blighted area” means an area that, in its present condition and use
and, by reason of the presence of at least four of the following factors,
substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality,
retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an
economic or social liability, and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2007). Texas defines “blighted area” in a similar manner:
“Blighted area” means an area that is not a slum area, but that, because of deteriorating buildings, structures, or other improvements;
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2. The Kelo Backlash in the State Courts
Not only have forty-two state legislatures passed laws restricting the use of eminent domain for economic development
purposes, but state courts have also responded by interpreting
pre-existing constitutional and statutory provisions so as to restrict overbroad blight designations on the state level.88 The
proliferation of successful challenges to blight designations and
condemnations indicates two things. First, it suggests that
even in the wake of substantial statutory reform, a significant
amount of eminent domain abuse continues. Second, it suggests
that courts, when confronted with eminent domain actions that
directly contravene state laws, are willing to intervene to strike
the actions down.
A brief look at some recent state supreme court decisions
affirms this trend.89 In 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court in City of
Norwood v. Horney reversed a lower court decision and held
that the city’s redevelopment scheme violated both the state
and federal constitutions.90 The court held that economic devel-

defective or inadequate streets, street layout, or accessibility; unsanitary conditions; or other hazardous conditions, adversely affects the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare of the municipality and its
residents, substantially retards the provision of a sound and healthful
housing environment, or results in an economic or social liability to
the municipality.
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 374.003(3) (Vernon 2005). See generally Somin,
supra note 21 (describing efforts by states to reform their eminent domain
laws after Kelo).
88. This response again has its roots in Justice Stevens’s Kelo opinion. In
his footnotes to the section discussing the possibility for narrower treatments
of “public use” on the state level, Justice Stevens explicitly cites not only efforts on the part of state legislatures to pass tougher eminent domain laws,
but also state court decisions construing preexisting state laws and constitutions more narrowly to prohibit economic development takings. See Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 & nn.22–24 (2005). This suggests that
Justice Stevens’s opinion may rest more upon stare decisis and an unwillingness to undermine Berman than upon a fundamental belief that courts should
afford legislatures absolute deference in urban planning. For example, in footnote 22, Justice Stevens cites County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(2004), in which the Supreme Court of Michigan overruled its infamous decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(1981), not on the basis of changed law, but upon a narrower reading of a
preexisting constitutional provision. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22.
89. See, e.g., Sapero v. Mayor of Baltimore, 920 A.2d 1061, 1076–79 (Md.
2007); Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447
(N.J. 2007); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1142–43 (Ohio
2006).
90. 853 N.E.2d at 1122–24.

754

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:741

opment alone is not a public use91 under the Ohio Constitution
and that the “deteriorating area” standard of the statute was
void-for-vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 That same year, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, while the owners of a temporary easement were not entitled to notice under the Due Process Clause,
the taking should be struck down anyway on the grounds that
there was no public use.93 In 2007, the New Jersey Supreme
Court struck down the city of Paulsboro’s classification of a
property as “in need of redevelopment” by interpreting the
“blighted areas” clause94 of the New Jersey constitution to narrow the scope of the redevelopment statute.95
The federal courts also have begun looking more sympathetically at challenges to redevelopment projects. For example,
in 2005, only a few months after the Kelo decision, the Second
Circuit held that the actions of a condemning agency violated
procedural due process when the agency failed to give the property owners a meaningful opportunity to be heard in challenging the purpose of the condemnation.96 The court ruled that, by
failing to provide the owner notice of the thirty-day period
which provided the only window for challenging the finding of
public use, the city effectively made it impossible for property
owners to realize their rights.97 The continued inability of property owners to claim their rights poses a significant problem in
the context of urban redevelopment and condemnation proceedings and continues to pose an implementation problem for legislatures and agencies.98
91. Id. at 1140–41.
92. Id. at 1142–46.
93. R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 99, 104 (R.I. 2006).
94. N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
95. Gallenthin Realty Dev. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 460–62
(N.J. 2007).
96. Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 127–32 (2d Cir. 2005).
97. Id. at 132 (“Thus, we now hold that ‘reasonable notice’ under these
circumstances must include mention of the commencement of the thirty-day
challenge period. . . . It is not likely that the average landowner would have
appreciated that notice of the Determination and Findings began the exclusive
period in which to initiate a challenge to the condemnor’s determination.”).
98. For just one example for how this problem of inadequate procedures
and insensitive authorities has ensconced itself in the public imagination, see
DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 5–36 (1979). Within the first few pages of the novel, Earth is destroyed to make room for a
“hyperspatial express route” with no notice or ceremony to its inhabitants. Id.
at 35. The Vogons who are taking the planet for their route justify themselves
in a classic parody of an unsympathetic planning board’s public statement:
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Thus, despite the explosion of interest among state legislatures to reform state eminent domain codes and the increase of
state supreme courts striking down illegal redevelopment actions, a lingering problem remains. While the definitions of
blight have been tightened and economic development takings
have been banned in some cases, these reforms are only meaningful if they are carefully implemented. Thus envisioned, the
problem then is one of fostering the proper implementation of
protections that are already in place. Given that those who are
most likely to be affected by overbroad blight designations are
those who will be least prepared to challenge them, it is important to create a system in which claims against redevelopment
projects that directly contradict the spirit of the new state laws
are incentivized rather than discouraged.
C. THE MECHANICS OF REDEVELOPMENT
To appreciate some of the difficulties in challenging public
use and blight, it is helpful to examine the statutory basis for
these determinations. Although the exact statutory procedures
vary from state to state, an overview of the content of these
laws provides the general legal framework for most modern redevelopment projects.
1. Formation of a Redevelopment Area and Implementation of
Tax Increment Financing
The process of redevelopment generally begins with the
enactment of a tax increment financing (TIF) district and the
formation of a redevelopment commission or agency.99 This redevelopment commission is responsible for creating a redevelopment district and preparing a detailed redevelopment
plan.100 In this plan, the redevelopment agency makes findings
There’s no point acting all surprised about it. All the planning charts
and demolition orders have been on display in your local planning department in Alpha Centauri for fifty of your Earth years, so you’ve had
plenty of time to lodge any formal complaint and it’s far too late to
start making a fuss about it now.
Id. at 35–36.
99. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.174–.175 (West Interim Ann. Serv.
June 2008); see also Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 926–28 (1999) (explaining
the mechanics of a TIF project); Catherine Michel, Brother, Can You Spare a
Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 459 (1996) (explaining the structure of TIF and its use in Indiana).
100. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175; see also Goshorn, supra note 99,
at 926; J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financ-
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showing that the area meets certain criteria.101 Some states require a finding that the private investment would not reasonably be expected to occur without government intervention.102
Once the commission develops the plan, it must hold a public
hearing and provide notice of the hearing, generally by newspaper announcement.103 After the hearing, the plan commission
and the city council typically vote on whether to approve the
project.104
After a proposal is approved, the commission has substantial authority over the area.105 While the extent to which eminent domain powers may be used in an approved redevelopment district varies by state, typically, once an area is
designated as part of a redevelopment district, any use of eminent domain in the area is considered a valid public use.106
Furthermore, any objections to the designation not raised at
the initial public hearing are considered waived.107
Once the project is approved, the municipality implements
the tax increment financing portion of the statute by issuing
bonds to cover the costs of the project.108 These bonds are paid
ing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15, 17–18
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
101. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175.
102. See, e.g., id. subdiv. 3(b)(2)(i) (providing that the municipality shall
find that “the proposed development or redevelopment would not reasonably
be expected to occur solely through private investment within the reasonably
foreseeable future”); see also Goshorn, supra note 99, at 927.
103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175; see also Michel, supra note 99,
at 460.
104. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175 (requiring municipal approval
for a plan to proceed); see also Michel, supra note 99, at 460.
105. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.101 (West 2008) (setting forth the
powers of an economic development authority).
106. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c) (2006) (“An acquisition of
property primarily for the purpose of the elimination of blight is rebuttably
presumed to be for a public purpose and primarily for the benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public under this subsection.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.101
(providing for the creation of a redevelopment district); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 469.174, subdiv. 10 (West Interim Ann. Serv. June 2008) (setting forth the
requirements for a redevelopment district); see also Michel, supra note 99, at
462–63.
107. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c) (“Any challenge to the existence of blighting factors alleged in a complaint to condemn under this subsection shall be raised within 6 months of the filing date of the complaint to condemn, and if not raised within that time the right to challenge the existence of
those blighting factors shall be deemed waived.”).
108. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.1813–.1814 (West 2008); see also
Goshorn, supra note 99, at 926–27.
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off by any incremental growth in property-tax revenues from
the redevelopment project area.109 This is accomplished by
freezing the property tax assessments paid into the city treasury during the period of the redevelopment project so that the
city continues to receive the same revenue from the property
taxes even as the value of the property rises.110 Since the property owners pay taxes on the actual value of the property, any
increase in property tax revenue can be used to pay off the
debts incurred to finance the redevelopment.111 Once the bonds
are paid off, the property-tax assessments can be unfrozen and
the city receives the full balance of the tax revenues.112 The
idea behind TIF is that the redevelopment project will cause a
rise in the surrounding property values and that the city will
use the additional tax revenue to pay off the bonds that it issued to finance the redevelopment.113 Some have criticized this
theory, suggesting that most increases in property values
would have occurred even in the absence of the redevelopment.114
2. Challenging a Redevelopment Plan
In this system, challenges to findings of public use and
blight come in two contexts. First, after an administrative declaration of blight but before condemnation of properties, a
property owner seeking to challenge the public use of a particular redevelopment project may bring a reverse validation action
within a set period of time.115 Otherwise, a challenge may come
once a redevelopment agency brings condemnation proceedings
against a property owner.116 Typically, in such a condemnation
109. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.177–.178 (West 2008); see also Goshorn, supra note 99, at 927–28; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 996–97.
110. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.177; see also Goshorn, supra note 99,
at 927–28; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 996–97.
111. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.177; see also Goshorn, supra note 99,
at 927–28; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 996.
112. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.177; see also Goshorn, supra note 99,
at 928.
113. See Goshorn, supra note 99, at 928–29; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 997.
114. See Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 997.
115. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501 (West 2008) (setting
forth a cause of action for a reverse validation action challenging a redevelopment plan and setting a ninety-day window for bringing the challenge); id.
§ 33501.2 (providing that those issues not raised at the administrative level
are waived for subsequent judicial proceedings); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 860
(West 2008) (setting forth the procedural basis for challenging such an action).
116. See 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.05[1] (3d ed. 2006).
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the only way that a property owner may obtain injunctive relief
is to show that the condemnation is not a public use within the
meaning of the statute.117 In states that limit redevelopment to
blighted areas, this showing frequently turns on whether the
property is blighted or whether development would not happen
but-for the intervention of the agency.118 In addition to or instead of the public use challenge, the owner may also challenge
the agency’s offer of payment as not the just compensation required by law.119
II. REDEVELOPMENT REFORM AND THE PROBLEM OF
IMPLEMENTATION: AWARDING LITIGATION EXPENSES
AS A MEANS OF EMPOWERING PROPERTY OWNERS TO
CHALLENGE ILLEGAL CONDEMNATIONS
Despite the paradigm shift in the treatment of public use
and blight in state legislatures and courts and the increased interest in providing procedural protections for property owners,
statutes limiting the power of municipal redevelopment agencies are difficult to apply in practice, leading to persistent under-implementation.120 States have considered a variety of
means to reinforce procedural and substantive protections, including granting the state attorney general or other public figure the power to review redevelopment plans,121 entrusting the
decision-making power for redevelopment districts to elected
city councils rather than unelected redevelopment officers,122 or
passing fee-shifting statutes to provide property owners full
access to the courts.123 Part II of this Note analyzes the issues
that states face in implementing additional protections for
property owners and suggests that a simple fee-shifting statute
117. See id. (noting that the government entity seeking to take the property must first show it has the “right to condemn” the property).
118. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810 (2000).
119. See 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 116.
120. See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, REDEVELOPMENT AFTER REFORM: A PRELIMINARY LOOK (1994), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/
1994/redevelopment_after_reform.html.
121. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp. 2008).
122. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J. LEGIS.
165, 178 (2006) (“To promote transparency and political accountability, Congress might require that local officials compile a record and set forth their justifications for concluding that a project will benefit the public as well as a private developer. Perhaps it can also require that the politically-accountable
officials make the decision.”).
123. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006).
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is the most efficient mechanism for improving these statutes.
This Part also discusses the theory behind fee-shifting statutes
in the eminent domain context and evaluates the strengths and
weaknesses of several such statutes already in place.
A. BLIGHT, CONDEMNATION, AND THE PROBLEM OF
IMPLEMENTATION
Although states acted to limit the power of cities to engage
in redevelopment for economic growth, these reforms are only
as effective as the means of implementing them. Take the definition of blight. Notoriously difficult to define, blight provides
an easy label to assign to communities that may or may not be
in a serious state of disrepair.124 A redevelopment agency looking for a successful project may be tempted to include more
land in a redevelopment district than is strictly necessary since
the agency will generally finance the project with tax revenue
derived from the entire redevelopment district.125 This is equally true for the determinations of public use and but-for causation that also frequently figure prominently in agency decisionmaking.126 Thus, while there are doubtless many instances of
genuine blight and slums for which the use of eminent domain
may be appropriate, there are many others in which specious
blight designations are used by well-connected developers to
obtain bargaining advantages in real estate negotiations.127
124. See Gordon, supra note 83, at 320–24.
125. See Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 1003–04 (“Despite formal legal requirements, there is usually only a weak connection between an area’s TIF potential and its blight. A redevelopment agency with a strong survival instinct
needs to produce tax increments starting in the year after the redevelopment
boundaries are set. . . . This usually precludes redevelopment of the most
crime-ridden and poverty-stricken sites in town because there is simply no alternate market for them.”).
126. See Gordon, supra note 83, at 323–25.
127. See, e.g., R.I. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 106 (R.I. 2006)
(“It is apparent to us that changes . . . that RIAC could not achieve at the bargaining table were obtained in Superior Court through an exercise of the
state’s eminent domain authority.”); Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 994–95 (“As city
renewal directors came to accept the fact that private developers had no capacity to re-build in the worst parts of cities, they searched for ‘the blight that’s
right’—places just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract developers.
When program administrators couldn’t legitimately find blight in areas with
good prospects for redevelopment, they fabricated it.”); Somin, supra note 35,
at 264–71 (detailing a number of particularly troubling instances in which a
blight rationale was used for redeveloping areas that would not meet any layperson’s definition of blight); Andrew Jacobs, Judge Stops Newark Redevelopment Project, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at B3 (describing a case in which the
“close links” between the city administration and the developers raised serious
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Furthermore, the procedural protections of due process are of
little benefit to property owners unless they are enforced rigorously and uniformly.128
The recent proliferation of state supreme court decisions
striking down redevelopment plans as illegal, often under newly reformed state laws, suggests that courts are willing to enforce stricter statutes.129 However, the large number of recent
decisions also suggests that redevelopment agencies frequently
do not police themselves with the rigor necessary to maintain
the balance between redevelopment interests and property interests that many state legislatures intended. For example,
California limits the use of eminent domain to blighted areas,
and California courts are frequently willing to interpret these
statutes strictly against the redevelopment agencies.130 However, even after a significant redevelopment reform effort in the
1990s, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office reported that
there was “no evidence that redevelopment project areas” were
“smaller in size or more focused on eliminating urban blight
than project areas adopted in earlier years.”131 It went on to
suggest that, because of the “decentralized and weak” oversight
system, the legislature could have “no assurance that communities will follow its intent regarding the [Community Redevelopment Law]—or that questionable redevelopment activities
will be reviewed and challenged.”132 Thus, even states engaged
in a serious overhaul of their redevelopment statutes may have
trouble changing the long-standing practices of redevelopment
agencies and translating legislative reform into concrete protections and safeguards for property owners.
Given the cost of challenging a redevelopment agency’s decision to designate a particular property as blighted, it is likely
that many valid challenges are never brought.133 This is particquestions about the misuse of redevelopment statutes).
128. See, e.g., Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 129–32 (2d
Cir. 2005) (emphasizing the importance of notice in the eminent domain context).
129. See, e.g., Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924
A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1142–43
(Ohio 2006); R.I. Dev. Corp., 892 A.2d at 106.
130. Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 991. For a decision in which a California
court struck down redevelopment proposals as not complying with state blight
laws, see Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000).
131. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 120.
132. Id.
133. See Hearing, supra note 40, at 26 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions)
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ularly true in residential neighborhoods where the costs of
bringing a suit may surpass the value of the homes themselves.134 Given that substantial research indicates that those
property owners who are affected by blight designations and
eminent domain tend to have less education and less wealth
than the average American, this problem is particularly
acute.135 This makes it difficult for large portions of the population to obtain any legal remedy, thus undermining the efforts of
state legislatures and courts to redress these important problems.136
This problem is particularly pronounced for those property
owners who want injunctive relief (i.e. no redevelopment) rather than additional compensation.137 Since many eminent domain attorneys work on a contingency fee basis, property owners who want to keep their property rather than negotiate for a
better offer may have additional difficulties finding an attorney
to represent them.138 Although there are some public interest
firms that do work in this area and some attorneys who are
willing to volunteer their services pro bono, the demand for this
type of work substantially outstrips the supply.139
B. IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The problems that property owners face in opposing redevelopment projects have not gone unnoticed and several potentially useful solutions have been proposed. For example, some
(“Having represented property owners in condemnation lawsuits, I would say
it is very difficult and expensive for the property owner . . . to defend the taking. . . . [T]o do a long-term, in-the-trenches battle with the city to contest the
taking may cost $50,000 or $100,000 right out of their pocket, and most people
don’t have it.”).
134. See id.
135. See BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.:
HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 28–29 (1989) (discussing the disproportionate
impact the urban renewal projects of the mid-twentieth century had on poor
minority communities).
136. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 888–89 (discussing the
increased likelihood that owners of low-value homes will be undercompensated
because of their inability to afford adequate legal counsel).
137. See Hearing, supra note 40, at 21 (statement of Thomas W. Merrill,
Professor, Columbia University School of Law).
138. Id. (“It is very important for the Congress to understand the way in
which most property owners are able to obtain a lawyer in an eminent domain
case. They hire someone on a contingent fee arrangement, and so it is critical
for people to get legal representation that there be some money on the table
out of which the contingency fee lawyer can be compensated.”).
139. See id. at 21–22.
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suggest that state legislatures should give the state attorneys
general the responsibility to review redevelopment plans and
act as a check on overzealous redevelopment agencies.140 Utah
implemented a version of this solution, creating the Office of
the Property Rights Ombudsman in 1997.141 The purpose of
this office is to aid in mediation of land disputes and to determine the fairness of redevelopment agencies’ actions.142 This
solution has proven effective in reducing the amount of litigation over property rights disputes in Utah by applying the principles of alternative dispute resolution to the eminent domain
context.143 The agency also helps property owners opposing a
redevelopment action by providing them with additional information for free and a neutral arbitrator to serve as a check on
agency overreaching.144 Ombudsman statutes certainly alleviate some of the problems associated with overreaching redevelopment agencies, and states looking to give additional protections to property owners should consider them.145 However,
although they create an additional forum for resolving issues,
they are not sufficient alone to ensure fair representation for
the property owner and do little to enable the property owner to
obtain independent legal counsel.146 Furthermore, although
having a neutral arbitrator might resolve some disputes, it also
creates a bureaucracy that may not be responsive to the unique
needs of individual property owners.
140. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 120 (“Specifically, we
recommend that the Legislature pass legislation requiring local governments
to submit all proposed redevelopment plans, pass-through agreements, and
five-year implementation plans to the state for a finding of consistency with
the [Community Redevelopment Law]. . . . [W]e recommend that this responsibility be assigned to the state Attorney General.”).
141. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp. 2008). It is worth
noting, however, that the ombudsman in Utah is independent from the attorney general and is separately funded. See CRAIG M. CALL, HOW UTAH RESOLVES EMINENT DOMAIN DISPUTES 2 (2007), http://www.propertyrights
.utah.gov/booklet_how-ut-resolves-emdom-disputes.pdf.
142. See Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman, Home Page, http://
propertyrights.utah.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (describing the nature of
the ombudsman office).
143. See CALL, supra note 141, at 2.
144. Id. at 2, 6.
145. For a useful discussion of some of the advantages of ombudsman statutes, see Hannah Jacobs, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of 2006 Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1560–62 (2007).
146. See CALL, supra note 141, at 6 (“The process is not meant to suggest
that property owners must avoid lawyers. The OPRO allows full participation
by counsel for either party.”).
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Another possible approach would require that those who
make the final decisions on redevelopment projects be elected
representatives rather than unelected redevelopment officials.147 While this solution would increase political accountability, its effectiveness would necessarily be somewhat limited.148 While elected officials who abused their authority
could be voted out of office after the fact, this would not get
someone’s home or business back if it had already been taken.149 Furthermore, this would not necessarily create sufficient
disincentives for officials in cases in which only a small number
of property owners were affected, since they would be unlikely
to have enough political clout to force anyone out of office.150
Although both the aforementioned proposals have some
merit, the most attractive approach to improving implementation of eminent domain statutes is a fee-shifting statute, which
would allow property owners to obtain attorney’s fees and other
litigation expenses in cases in which the homeowner is the prevailing party. Over the last forty years, both state and federal
governments have used fee-shifting statutes in many different
contexts to enable private individuals to bring certain types of
lawsuits that serve some larger public goal.151 This type of statute has already been enacted in a number of states in the emi147. See Bell, supra note 122, at 178.
148. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 35, at 201–03 (discussing challenges associated with relying on the political system to correct for these problems).
149. For an example of this type of situation, see Wameng Moua, New
Eminent Domain Reform Brings Joy to Local Businessman, but Doesn’t Get
His Land Back, HMONG TODAY, May 26, 2006, at 1, available at http://www
.hmongtoday.com/displaynews.asp?ID=2254.
150. Justice Thomas addressed this issue in his dissenting opinion in Kelo
v. City of New London, writing that
these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those
communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands
to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically
powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review
of constitutional provisions that protect “discrete and insular minorities” surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects.
545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
151. See Michael Wietecki, Comment, True Access to the Courts for Citizens
Working to Protect Natural Resources: Incorporating Attorney’s Fees into the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 147,
164–80 (2006) (discussing the use of fee-shifting to incentivize private actions
enforcing environmental regulations); see generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 220–26
(1994) (discussing awards of attorneys’ fees under federal law).
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nent domain context,152 and expanding this approach to other
states would be both simple and effective. For states concerned
about the balance of power between state agencies and individuals in condemnation actions, a fee-shifting statute would help
to even the odds by allowing private individuals to pursue meritorious legal claims against redevelopment agencies aided by
counsel. The remainder of this Note analyzes the advantages
and disadvantages of this approach at length, with a focus on
states in which fee shifting has been utilized. It concludes by
synthesizing the best elements of a few different statutes to
provide a potential model statute that optimizes the various relevant considerations and could be enacted by state legislatures
concerned with this issue.
C. THE THEORY BEHIND FEE SHIFTING IN THE EMINENT
DOMAIN CONTEXT
Under the American Rule, parties to litigation generally
pay their own fees although state and federal legislatures have
carved out numerous exceptions to this general policy.153 While
a number of states have crafted exceptions to the American
Rule in the eminent domain context,154 there is little scholarly
discourse as to the theoretical justifications for such a move.
Thus, before examining the current legal landscape in this
area, it is worthwhile to examine why an application of feeshifting principles might be uniquely appropriate in the eminent domain context.
1. Comparison of Fee-Shifting in Eminent Domain and the
Citizen Suit in Environmental Law
There is a long tradition of “citizen suits” in the AngloAmerican tradition, whereby an individual citizen brings suit
to enforce a larger government regulatory scheme and to ad152. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 73.092
(2005); IOWA CODE § 6B.33 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§
701–702 (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §
28-2-510 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06).
153. See Sisk, supra note 151, at 223; see generally John F. Vargo, The
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1634–35 (1993) (discussing the policies underlying
the american rule).
154. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122; FLA. STAT. § 73.092; IOWA
CODE § 6B.33; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66; MINN. STAT. § 117.031; N.Y.
EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 701–702; OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-2-510; WIS. STAT. § 32.28.
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vance some public good.155 The idea of delegating at least some
of the responsibility for enforcing regulatory schemes has been
adopted by many in the environmental movement who argue
that government agencies have been captured by lobbyists and
special interests and have therefore failed in their administrative duties.156 Here, fee shifting is seen as but one way of many
of enabling concerned citizens and attorneys to bring suits to
enforce legislative regulatory schemes that are being persistently under enforced.157
While statutes providing for fee shifting in the eminent
domain context bear some resemblance to statutes dealing with
citizen suits, they arise in a qualitatively different context.
Most importantly, since property owners are typically the defendants in eminent domain proceedings, there is no need for
the private attorney general rationale. Those challenging findings of blight or public use are not citizens concerned about a
larger social or environmental problem, but are made involuntary parties in the redevelopment process. Even in cases where
the property owners are plaintiffs, they are still typically on the
defensive as their properties have usually been declared
blighted and are under threat of condemnation.158 Thus, even
when a property owner sues to challenge a finding of blight, his
motivation for the suit is typically to raise the issue within the
short statute of limitations after an administrative finding of
blight so as to preserve the right to challenge the issue of public
use later on rather than simply to act as a check on agency
overreaching.159 Thus, while the regulatory-enhancement rationale of the citizen suit remains, it is coupled in the eminent
domain action with very serious considerations of equity.

155. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental
Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 835 (1985).
156. See id. at 837–38.
157. See id. at 835 (listing various devices, such as punitive damages, implied rights of action, and attorney’s fees provisions).
158. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501(a) (West 1999) (allowing property owners to challenge the validity of redevelopment plans); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 860, 863 (West 2007).
159. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33501, 33501.2 (West Supp.
2008) (providing a ninety-day window for challenging “the designation of the
survey area” after which such objections shall be waived).
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2. Fee-Shifting Statutes and the Spirit of the Constitutional
Mandate Requiring Just Compensation for Property Owners
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”160 Typically, just compensation is understood to be fair market value.161 However, in situations in
which the redevelopment agency’s initial offer is substantially
below market value or in which the taking of the property does
not comply with state law, a property owner who wishes to oppose the action has little choice but to hire a lawyer and incur
significant additional expenses.162 Thus, even if the property
owner receives the fair market value for the property or obtains
injunctive relief, he will not be made whole because he will still
have to personally bear the costs of litigation.163 Furthermore,
there is a significant possibility that the prohibitive costs of litigation may make a condemnee forgo an otherwise meritorious
claim and accept less than fair market value.164
This is not to suggest that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution mandates that attorney’s fees be paid by the government for parties opposing eminent domain actions,165 but it
does support an argument that fee-shifting provisions flow from
the spirit of the Fifth Amendment.166 The idea of fee shifting in
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. For a discussion of some of the limitations of such a “market value”
calculation, see EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 182–83 (“Yet market price still contains a systematic bias that underestimates the use value, which is typically
in excess of its exchange value.”).
162. N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, 1987 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, reprinted in N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701
(Consol. 2008).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. For the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of this argument,
see Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930) (holding that attorney’s fees
are not part of the “just compensation” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment).
For a more recent Ninth Circuit decision following this opinion, see United
States v. 4.18 Acres of Land, 542 F.2d 786, 788 (1976).
166. An interesting turn-of-the-century case does suggest that litigation
expenses be included in a computation of “just compensation”:
The Constitution requires that private property shall not be taken for
public purposes except upon the payment of “just compensation”; and
a man who is forced into court, where he owes no obligation to the
party moving against him, cannot be said to have received “just compensation” for his property if he is put to an expense appreciably important to establish the value of his property.
In re Water Supply in N.Y., 109 N.Y.S. 652, 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908), aff ’d,
85 N.E. 1117 (N.Y. 1908).
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condemnation actions has a long-standing pedigree and found
some champions as early as the nineteenth century.167 While
fee shifting in eminent domain actions may not be required by
the Constitution, there is certain equity in treating the property owners’ lawyers as a cost of redevelopment, similar to the
way in which the redevelopment agency’s lawyers are
treated.168 The New York Law Revision Commission adopted
this logic in its 1987 proposals for reform.169 In its proposals,
the Commission recommended that the New York legislature
adopt a statute that would allow judges to award costs and litigation expenses to property owners opposing condemnation actions in some circumstances.170 The New York legislature implemented these recommendations that same year to loosen
some of the restrictions on attorneys’-fees awards.171 Since
then, this legislation has enabled judges to award attorney’s
fees to property owners for meritorious claims in numerous instances, providing meaningful benefits to New York property
owners facing the threat of condemnation.172

167. One court wrote that
[a] person or corporation whose property is sought to be taken under
condemnation proceedings is entitled to be heard at every step in the
process, and in justice should be compensated, not only for the land or
property taken, but should be indemnified against all costs and expenses reasonably incurred either in resisting the appropriation or in
the proceedings for ascertaining the compensation to be made.
City of Brooklyn v. Long Island Water-Supply Co., 42 N.E. 413, 413 (N.Y.
1895).
168. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 888–90 (discussing fee
shifting as one attempt by state legislatures to even the balance of power between property owners and the government).
169. N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162.
170. Id.
171. See N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003) (as amended in
1987).
172. See, e.g., Gelsomino v. City of New Rochelle, 809 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding that the trial court appropriately awarded the
property owners attorneys’ fees where the condemnor’s original offer was
$310,000 and the court awarded $420,000); In re Williamsburgh II Urban Renewal Area, 616 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (affirming the decision of the lower court to award attorney’s fees when the claimant was
awarded $152,000 rather than the $52,000 offered by the condemnor); Malin v.
State, 584 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that the claimant
was entitled to attorney’s fees after the trial court found her property was
worth $475,000 rather than the $265,400 that she was initially offered by the
State).
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3. Using Fee-Shifting Statutes to Incentivize Meritorious
Causes of Action and to Deter Agency Abuse
One of the most common criticisms of fee-shifting provisions, particularly one-way fee-shifting provisions, is that they
incentivize frivolous litigation.173 Although this is certainly a
very reasonable concern in general, it is of much less concern in
the eminent domain context because the parties challenging a
determination of blight or public use are involuntary participants in many senses. They do not seek out the litigation, but
merely are resisting municipal actions that threaten to take
away their property.
Furthermore, state legislatures may largely eliminate the
danger of incentivizing frivolous lawsuits by conditioning the
recovery of litigation expenses and other costs on prevailing in
the lawsuit.174 Lawyers representing parties who could not otherwise pay would carefully weigh the merits of the lawsuit and
the likelihood of success before taking the case.175 Furthermore,
the rules of civil procedure are designed to penalize lawyers
and litigants who bring frivolous lawsuits, providing a further
disincentive to engage in this practice.176 Thus, while property
owners might occasionally raise frivolous claims regarding just
compensation or public use, it is unlikely that the fee-shifting
statute would be responsible for encouraging such claims.177
Along with enabling property owners to bring meritorious
claims, these statutes serve the secondary function of deterring
redevelopment agencies from taking actions of questionable legality.178 The knowledge that well-represented property owners
would almost certainly challenge such actions in court would
likely make agencies more cautious about declaring large sections of a city blighted and more willing to make comprehensive

173. But see Boyer & Meidinger, supra 155, at 934 (noting that fee-shifting
statutes in the environmental context do not seem to have incentivized frivolous law suits).
174. Cf. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney’s Fees Against the
Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 742–44 (1993) (discussing the issues that can go into defining a “prevailing party”).
175. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 155, at 934 (stating that fee shifting in the environmental context has not seemed to produce frivolous lawsuits).
176. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions in response to frivolous suits brought in federal court).
177. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 155, at 934.
178. See Sisk, supra note 151, at 220.
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findings of fact available to the public prior to the condemnation to insulate the taking from challenge.
These statutes, where enacted, have had a real impact of
significantly improving property owners’ access to attorneys.
For example, in Florida, one of the states that has enacted the
toughest fee-shifting laws,179 a group of law firms are devoted
to providing representation to property owners in eminent domain actions without charging them fees.180 Even in those
states with less strict fee-shifting provisions, there are a significant number of law firms that advertise the accessibility of
their services to all property owners.181
4. Enhancing Principles of Federalism While Promoting a
Client-Centered Approach
In addition to enabling property owners to bring meritorious claims while deterring abuse of municipal authority, feeshifting statutes operate well within the context of federalism.182 These statutes, passed by state legislatures, enhance
the substantive procedural protections that the state already
has in place. This approach has the advantage of squarely addressing the federalism concerns raised by the National League
of Cities in their amicus brief supporting the city in Kelo.183 In
179. See FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2005).
180. See, e.g., Fixel, Maguire & Willis, Responsibility for Fees, http://www
.fla-eminentdomain.com/fees.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); Florida Property
Rights Law Firm, P.A., http://www.florida-eminent-domain.com/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2008).The Law Firm of Savlov and Anderson, P.A., Economics of Eminent Domain, http://www.flaeminentdomain.com/practiceareas/economics-ofeminent-domain.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
181. See, e.g., Archer & Greiner, P.C., Condemnation and Eminent Domain
Law, http://www.archerlaw.com/ (follow “Practices” hyperlink; then “Litigation
Services”; then “Condemnation and Eminent Domain Law”) (last visited Nov.
3, 2008) (New Jersey firm offering eminent-domain services on a contingency
basis and advertising recovery of attorney’s fees); Niebler & Roth, LLP, Condemnation/Eminent Domain Law, http://www.nieblerroth.com/practiceareas/
eminent-domain-law.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (Wisconsin firm offering
eminent-domain services and advertising fact that Wisconsin law allows recovery of attorney’s fees).
182. Cf. Hearing, supra note 40, at 16 (statement of Thomas W. Merrill,
Professor, Columbia University School of Law) (expressing a preference for
allowing states to determine their own level of substantive protections rather
than setting a uniform national standard); Klass, supra note 19, at 690–94
(discussing the advantages of reform on the state level in the context of eminent domain).
183. See Brief for the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–16, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166931.
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their brief, they argue that eminent domain is essentially a local concern, and the needs and preferences of the communities
of Utah may be quite distinct from those of the communities of
Connecticut.184 By passing fee-shifting statutes that require the
redevelopment agencies to pay the property owner’s attorney’s
fees, state legislatures will have the opportunity to reinforce existing procedures and protections.185 Thus, this type of statute
naturally reinforces the principle of federalism by allowing
states to set and reinforce differing levels of protection.
While promoting a local approach to the problem of eminent domain reform, fee-shifting statutes also shift more power
to the individual whose property is in danger of being taken, allowing him, with the advice of his lawyer, to determine the best
course to pursue.186 For some property owners, this may be additional compensation and relocation expenses; for others, it
may be injunctive relief.187 By giving the property owner the
tools he needs to negotiate with the redevelopment agency on
an even ground, the statutes serve to empower individuals in
what otherwise might be perceived as a very disempowering
situation.188
D. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO STATUTES AWARDING
LITIGATION EXPENSES
The majority of states do not provide for attorney’s fees for
property owners challenging public use or blight designations
in condemnation actions, but a substantial minority of states189
184. Id. at 12–13.
185. See id. at 13 (highlighting the right of states to set higher levels of
protections than the federal baseline).
186. This is true both for pre condemnation negotiations as well as for actual court proceedings. See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 126 (2006) (“Most
academic discussions of the undercompensation problem overlook another important fact: the compensation that a property owner receives almost always
results from a bargain between the owner and a Taker, rather than a judicial
determination of the property's fair market value.”).
187. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890 (discussing feeshifting statutes as one way state legislatures have tried to restore the balance
between the property owners and the government).
188. For a vivid example of the significant difference having an attorney
can make to negotiations over “just compensation,” see Gaylord Merlin Ludovici Diaz & Bain, Notable Cases, http://www.gaylordmerlin.com/notable_cases
.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (highlighting differences between initial offers
for property and the final price reached with the aid of representation).
189. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890 (citing Garnett, supra
note 186, at 129 & n.175) (estimating that twenty states have provisions that
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have laws that do just this.190 A careful survey of the landscape
of current fee-shifting statutes is useful, both for understanding
the diversity of approaches within this area of law and for understanding the shortcomings and strengths of these approaches.
There are four main categories of statutes that shift some
or all of the property owner’s litigation expenses in the eminent
domain context: unconditional fee shifting, conditional fee shifting, limited reimbursements, and judicial discretion.191 Unconditional fee shifting likely allows fee shifting in favor of property owners regardless of the outcome of litigation,192 while
conditional fee shifting generally conditions the property owner’s award of litigation expenses on being a prevailing party to
the litigation.193 Limited-reimbursement statutes allow for
awards of litigation expenses up to a certain dollar amount,194
and judicial discretion statutes generally leave the decision of
whether or not to award attorney’s fees to the trial judge’s discretion in each particular case.195 It is helpful to examine an
example of each type in turn to understand the types of protections available.
1. Unconditional Fee Shifting
Florida has some of the strongest protections for property
owners in the country,196 and Florida law provides that attorney’s fees are recoverable unconditionally.197 In determining
awards of litigation expenses in Florida, courts look both to
Florida statutes and to the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of
“full compensation,”198 which together have generally been inprovide for fee shifting in some cases in the eminent domain context).
190. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 73.092
(2005); IOWA CODE § 6B.33 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§
701–02 (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §
28-2-510 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06).
191. See N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162, pt. IV.
192. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.092.
193. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (authorizing award of attorney’s fees
when the difference between the amount offered and the amount awarded exceeds twenty percent or when the court determines that the taking is not for
public use).
194. See, e.g., 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008).
195. See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701.
196. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 13.
197. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091–.131.
198. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091–.131.

772

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:741

terpreted to include attorney’s fees.199 One Florida court described the purpose of this law as “to permit the owner to contest the value placed on his property by the condemning authority and at the same time come out whole.”200 This idea is
even more clearly set forth in City of Miami Beach v. Liflans
Corp.,201 in which the court required the condemner pay the
property owner’s attorney’s fees despite the fact that a jury
awarded no compensation.202 The idea is premised on the concept that when a property owner’s home or business is condemned, he becomes an involuntary participant in litigation
and should have the right to have his attorney’s fees paid, even
if his claim fails.203
This line of reasoning is compelling, particularly when the
property owner is an involuntary defendant and chooses to
challenge a very close legal issue.204 However, the statute may
be too broad in some circumstances, particularly if the property
owner’s claim is frivolous and is dismissed without awarding
additional compensation or any other form of relief.205 Furthermore, the statute does not apply to property owners who
are bringing suit themselves to challenge an overbroad blight
designation or but-for agency determinations, both fixtures of
the modern redevelopment landscape.206 A simpler statute that
199. See Ga. S. & Fla. R.R. Co. v. Duval Connecting R.R. Co., 187 So. 2d
405, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (“Thus it is seen that the public policy of
this state as evidenced by the cited constitutional and statutory provisions has
been to secure to a landowner full compensation—not full compensation less
the expenses of his lawyer.”).
200. Hodges v. Div. of Admin., 323 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975), superseded by statute, 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-148, § 2, as recognized in
Dep’t of Transp. v. Jack’s Quick Cash, Inc., 748 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999).
201. 259 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
202. Id. at 516.
203. The Florida Supreme Court put the point as follows:
Since the owner of private property sought to be condemned is forced
into court by one to whom he owes no obligation, it cannot be said
that he has received “just compensation” for his property if he is compelled to pay out of his own pocket the expenses of establishing the
fair value of the property, which expenses in some cases could conceivably exceed such value.
Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604–05 (Fla. 1950).
204. See Hodges, 323 So. 2d at 277 (finding that an award of attorney’s fees
was appropriate when the issue challenged was close, even though the property owner ultimately lost).
205. For a version of this critique, see N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N,
supra note 162, pts. IV, V.
206. See Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Gibbins, 696 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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combines the conditional-fee-shifting model for successful suits
and the judicial discretion model in limited cases may better
achieve the right balance along with fairly predictable results.
2. Conditional Fee Shifting
Under Minnesota law,207 attorney’s fees are recoverable
conditional on the property owner receiving an award of compensation greater than what the condemning authority offered
or upon a court determination that the taking is unlawful.208
The Minnesota law is intriguing because it combines elements
of the conditional recovery and the judicial discretion models. A
court must make an award of litigation expenses to a property
owner receiving an award of more than forty percent of the
condemner’s initial offer or if the taking is proven to be not for
public use or illegal.209 On the other hand, the court may award
litigation expenses to a property owner recovering between
twenty and forty percent more than the initial offer.210 Other
states, including Wisconsin211 and Oklahoma,212 have enacted
similar laws.
This is a sophisticated approach and accomplishes several
useful objectives. Most importantly, it ensures that property
owners will be reimbursed for the worst instances of eminent
domain abuse, while avoiding the possibility of overincentivizing litigation. However, by setting the bar for mandatory recovery at forty percent more than the initial offer,213 the
Minnesota statute may discourage attorneys from bringing solid cases that are likely to fall within the discretionary range.
Furthermore, the Minnesota statute might be improved by allowing more judicial discretion in awarding fees in determinations of public use in which the claim is a close one but the
property owner ultimately loses. Despite these limitations,
Minnesota’s law remains one of the strongest and provides a

App. 1997) (reversing an award of attorneys’ fees because, although there was
an administrative proceeding by the Department of Environmental Protection
seeking access to the plaintiff ’s property, there was no actual eminent domain
proceeding within the meaning of the statute).
207. MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006).
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06).
212. OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001).
213. MINN. STAT. § 117.031.
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partial framework for the proposed statute in Part III of this
Note.
3. Limited Reimbursement
Pennsylvania takes the limited-reimbursement route to
awarding attorney’s fees for opposing a condemnation action.214
Under the Pennsylvania statute, the attorney’s-fee award
available to a property owner’s lawyer is capped at four thousand dollars, with some exceptions.215 Although this type of statute provides some compensation to the individual property
owner opposing a government action and is relatively simple to
administer, the amount of compensation will almost certainly
be less than the actual cost in attorney’s fees and will undercompensate the property owner.216 Thus, while this statute was
intended to “materially assist the owner of a property interest,”217 the notably low cap on awards renders the statute relatively ineffective in balancing the power between the redevelopment agency and property owner, making it the least
satisfactory of the four categories.218
4. Judicial Discretion
Under New York law, attorney’s fees are recoverable at the
discretion of the trial judge.219 The statute gives substantial deference to the trial judge, stating that “where an order or award
is substantially in excess of the amount of the condemnor’s
proof” the court “may in its discretion” award the condemnee
“an additional amount.”220 While it is true that the trial judge
has a unique perspective on the litigation and can make
nuanced judgments that legislatures cannot make in advance,
by vesting almost unlimited discretion in the trial judge, the
statute provides uncertain protections for property owners and
invites unequal administration of the law.221 While an ap214. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008).
215. Id. §§ 306(g), 308(d), 709.
216. See N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162, pt. IV.
217. JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM., COMMENT (1971), reprinted in 26 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008).
218. See N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162, at pt. IV.
219. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003).
220. Id.
221. A look at some of the appellate decisions in which a state court of appeals had to overturn a trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees supports this general concern. See, e.g., County of Oswego v. Maroney, 588 N.Y.S.2d 478, 478
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that the trial court erred in denying attorney’s
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proach emphasizing judicial discretion is useful in close cases,
mandatory awards are more appropriate in cases where the
property owner clearly qualifies as a prevailing party because
they promote the enforcement of eminent domain statutes by
increasing the willingness of attorneys to take on difficult cases.
III. A MODEL STATUTE TO BE ENACTED BY STATE
LEGISLATURES
In light of this analysis, the following statute combines the
best elements of the existing state statutes by adopting a bright
line rule for fee shifting in most situations, including all those
involving determinations of just compensation, while allowing
for some judicial discretion in proceedings involving close questions of public use. It adopts the general elements of the conditional-fee-shifting statute by providing for mandatory awards
in certain circumstances in which the property owner has clearly prevailed. By requiring a property owner to recover at least
twenty percent more than the condemnor’s initial offer, it
avoids encouraging property owners to bring claims that are
not worth litigating while still setting the bar low enough not to
discourage property owners from bringing legitimate grievances to court.
In addition to enabling property owners to bring meritorious claims for just compensation, this statute allows for full
recovery of litigation expenses, including expenses related to
administrative proceedings, where property owners can show
the condemnation is not for a public use within the meaning of
state law. Furthermore, in light of the importance of determinations of public use in the eminent domain statutory scheme
in most states, this statute also allows for awards of litigation
expenses at a trial judge’s discretion in cases of public use. This
is not intended to encourage litigation, but to enable property
owners to contest close issues of public use by allowing a judge
to award litigation expenses if he finds that the claims were
substantially justified and that an award of litigation expenses
is necessary for just and adequate compensation in that particular case. This decision is left to the discretion of the trial judge
fees when the court’s award was more than two-hundred percent of the condemnor’s original offer); Scuderi v. State, 585 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (finding the trial court erred when it determined that a court award
41.4% in excess of the condemnor’s initial offer was not “substantially in
excess”).
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because he is in the best position to make the type of nuanced
and concrete judgments necessary to a fair determination of
this issue.
Model Fee-Shifting Statute
(1) In this section, “litigation expenses” means the sum of the costs,
disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees necessary to prepare for or participate in actual or anticipated proceedings before the condemnation commissioners, board of assessment or any other court.222 These expenses shall
include, but not be limited to, those expenses necessary to prepare for
and represent the property owner at the administrative level.
(2) Litigation expenses shall be awarded to the condemnee or challenger if:223
(a) the final judgment or award for damages, as determined at
any level of the eminent domain process, is more than 20 percent
greater than the last written offer of compensation made by the
condemning authority;224
(b) the proceeding is abandoned by the condemnor after the public use determination;225 or
(c) the court or any other reviewing body determines that the
condemnor does not have the right to condemn part or all of the
property described in the jurisdictional offer or there is no necessity for its taking.226
(3) Litigation expenses for the determination of public use may be
awarded to the condemnee or challenger if the trial judge deems it
necessary for just and adequate compensation of the condemnee or
challenger.

This statute combines some of the best elements of the feeshifting statutes. It creates a bright-line standard for when litigation expenses are recoverable in determinations of just compensation and combines both the conditional recovery model
and the judicial discretion model with regards to public use determinations, providing for mandatory recovery if the property
owner wins the public use issue and providing for recovery at
the sole discretion of the judge if the property owner loses a
close public use issue.
This statute is not intended to conclusively answer all challenges in implementing substantive and procedural protections
for property owners, nor is it intended to develop a revolutionary approach to fee shifting in the eminent domain context. It
is largely based on conditional fee-shifting statutes that have
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Cf. WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06).
Cf. id.
Cf. MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006).
Cf. WIS. STAT. § 32.28.
Cf. id.
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been successfully enacted in Minnesota and Wisconsin, but improves on them in several important ways.
First, this statute takes a unique approach to fee shifting
in the context of determinations of public use. Under both Minnesota227 and Wisconsin228 law, property owners who lose on
the issue of public use have no right to litigation expenses. This
statute takes a significantly more flexible approach. Like the
Minnesota and Wisconsin229 statutes, it guarantees that litigation expenses will be granted to the property owner who prevails on the issue of public use. However, it also provides that
litigation expenses may be granted at the trial judge’s discretion in situations where the property owner loses on the issue
of public use but the judge determines that the challenge was
reasonable and brought in good faith. This modification is made
in light of the importance that the American public clearly
places on fair determinations of public use in the wake of Kelo230 and on the importance of encouraging people to bring such
challenges when there is a significant possibility that the redevelopment agency is abusing its authority and condemning
property it has no right to condemn.
Regarding the issue of just compensation, this statute
adopts a purely conditional recovery approach, allowing recovery where the court awards more than twenty percent of the
condemning authority’s last written offer. In so doing, it sets
the mandatory bar for recovery lower than Minnesota231 and
higher than in Oklahoma.232 The decision to set the standard at
twenty percent is based on an understanding that, while it is
important to encourage individuals to challenge low appraisals
of their property, a recovery of only ten or fifteen percent more
than was originally offered is typically not worth the litigation.
Thus, this statute represents a compromise position, setting
the bar low enough to enable property owners to demand fair
compensation, but high enough to prevent wasteful litigation.
227. MINN. STAT. § 117.031.
228. WIS. STAT. § 32.28.
229. See MINN. STAT. § 117.031; WIS. STAT. § 32.28.
230. It seems safe to say much of the controversy surrounding Kelo deals
with what does and does not constitute a “public use” within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472
(2005) (“The question presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of
this property qualifies as a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”).
231. See MINN. STAT. § 117.031.
232. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001).
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Simple to enact, this statute could be passed by any state
legislature looking to improve implementation of preexisting
protections for property owners. While it is primarily intended
as a straightforward starting point for state legislatures that
are in the process of reforming their eminent domain codes and
are concerned about the effective implementation of these new
laws, it can also serve as a model for those states looking to optimize these laws in light of the recent developments in eminent domain law.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of fee-shifting statutes will not provide a
conclusive answer to the problems of eminent domain abuse.
The protections these statutes afford will be only as strong as
the substantive protections of the states and the willingness of
the courts to enforce these protections. However, fee-shifting
provisions provide promising means of creating a mechanism
that will both enable property owners to bring meritorious suits
they might otherwise not be able to afford and to provide meaningful deterrence to overzealous redevelopment agencies
which might otherwise be tempted to overreach their legislative
authority by offering less than just compensation or by relying
on specious blight designations to promote goals of private economic development. The utility of these statutes is necessarily
limited since they can only reinforce pre-existing legal protections. Thus, the enactment of attorney’s-fees provisions by state
governments should not be seen as the end of the debate, but
rather as a useful procedural mechanism to reinforce existing
state laws in a changing world.

